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ABSTRACT
Symphony orchestras are the supposed victims of a 
malignant disease entitled "Baumol's Disease." This disease 
occurs as costs rise at a faster rate than earned income.
The gap between earned income and costs is called the 
"Income Gap." The remedy is injections of cash to stop the 
disease from expanding.
This thesis takes actual data from the American 
Symphony Orchestra League and tests Baumol's diagnosis.
The data are first analyzed historically to measure if the 
income gap does exit and if it is growing over time. The 
results show that this is the case. Symphony orchestras 
experienced a significant growth in the income gap between 
1979 and 1986.
To determine if the income gap is an incurable disease, 
a more comprehensive model is developed. A deficit model is 
designed including output composition variables, demographic 
variables, and the lagged value of the income gap. This 
model shows that, in the majority of cases, symphony 
orchestras are not the victims of Baumol's Disease. The 
symphonies can control their destiny, at least in the long 
run.
Included within the paper is a review of selected 
literature including empirical studies similar to this one.
iii
This provides a theoretical framework for analyzing the 
empirical results. The results point out that the 
perseverance and durability of symphony orchestras may be 
underestimated. The injections of cash to alleviate the 
disease may only be a placebo for the majority of 
symphonies. It is in their power to stay healthy.
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1
INTRODUCTION
Symphony orchestras in the United States rely on earned 
income, contributions and grants in order to operate. It is 
believed that costs rise at a faster rate than earned 
income, signaling a growing need for tertiary support, in 
the form of private contributions or government grants, for 
orchestras to stay performing. The "income gap", as 
originally defined by Baumol and Bowen, is the difference 
between earned income of a performing arts organization and 
total costs.1
The performing arts are a labor intensive industry.
They rely greatly on labor (performers), in order to perform 
a concert. Because the performing arts are predominantly 
labor intensive, they cannot achieve the productivity gains 
which more capital intensive industries experience through 
innovation. They are unable to lessen substantially their 
dependency on labor. For this reason, revenue lags costs. 
Baumol and Bowen argue the need for an ever increasing 
public support of the performing arts. This unbalanced 
productivity growth is called "Baumol's disease."
Baumol's disease is malignant, in the sense that the
1William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing 
Arts - The Economic Dilemma (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1966), 147.
2
gap between earned income and costs is ever expanding.2 If 
the performing arts are to continue, they will require 
injections of cash to combat the disease they face. Baumol 
and Bowen make it clear that the responsibility must be 
taken by society:
The size of the total income gap is a crucial 
figure. This is the amount which, at the present 
time, society must be prepared to contribute, by 
some means, if the nation's existing performing 
arts organizations are to be kept solvent.3
Society must bridge the gap between earned income and 
expenditures, either through private contributions or 
government subsidy.
The purpose of this thesis is to test Baumol's 
diagnosis with particular reference to symphony orchestras 
in the United States. This report has five principal parts. 
First, I will review selected literature concerning the 
economics of the performing arts and symphony orchestras. 
Second, I will identify the data set used in this 
investigation. Third, the models employed in this analysis 
will be specified. Fourth, I will examine the results 
obtained in this study. Finally, the report will end with a 
concluding comment.
2Ibid., 161. The growing income gap assumes that other
industries are experiencing productivity gains.
3Ibid., 150.
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THE LITERATURE REVIEW
Baumol's diagnosis can be broken down into two testable 
assertions. The first is that the income gap exists. The 
second is that the income gap is inevitable.
The empirical tests of the first assertion are not 
extensive, because the data are difficult to obtain.
Using data from Australia, Throsby and Withers empirically 
tested the income gap in symphony orchestras, and found the 
gap between earned income and aggregate costs to exist, and 
to be growing over time.4 Baumol and Bowen themselves have 
found the gap to exist and to be expanding.5 Yet both 
studies have the deficiency of few observations in their 
samples (11 orchestras for Baumol-Bowen, and 2 for Throsby- 
Withers). Conclusions concerning all symphony orchestras in 
the United States are difficult to make from such limited 
samples.
The second assertion concerns the inevitability of the 
income gap. To deal with this question, we must look at the 
specific characteristics of the performing arts. All 
symphony orchestras in the American Symphony Orchestra 
League are organized as nonprofit firms. Why is this the
4David Throsby and Glenn Withers, The Economics of the 
Performing Arts (New York: St Martin's Press, 1979), 137.
5Baumol and Bowen, 423.
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case?
Symphony orchestras organize as nonprofit firms and 
depend on donations for a substantial fraction of their 
income.6 Firms which rely on donations normally organize 
as nonprofit firms for two reasons. First, any donations 
made to them are tax deductible. Second, people who make 
donations to nonprofit firms take less risk that the money 
they donate will go to purposes which they find undesirable. 
Donations made for specific purposes go toward those same 
purposes. Furthermore, nonprofit firms in the United States 
receive their charter from the government. They are 
considered "stamped and approved" as worthwhile 
philanthropic organizations, helping to facilitate donations 
from private sources. Orchestras rely on these donations in 
order to perform.
Hansmann provides a theoretical framework as to why 
performing arts organizations are organized as nonprofit 
firms. He argues that the demand curve faced by most 
performing arts organizations is below their average total 
cost curve at all quantities of output. There is not one 
price which they can charge to cover their average total 
costs. By organizing as nonprofit firms, symphonies 
facilitate their ability to solicit donations and establish
^enry Hansmann, "Nonprofit Enterprise in the 
Performing Arts," Bell Journal of Economics 12, (1981): 
341-361. Hansmann estimates between one-third and one-half 
of their income.
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an average price which covers average total costs.7
The typical audience attending symphony orchestra 
performances is characterized as financially well to do. 
According to Hansmann, a large proportion of the donations 
received come from those who attend the performing arts 
organizations' functions (e.g., symphony orchestra 
concerts). In other words, those who donate money also buy 
tickets. Hansmann terms this activity, "voluntary price 
discrimination."
The performing arts are generally characterized by high 
fixed costs.8 Symphony orchestras are housed in areas with 
a large number of seats, and a staging area from which to 
perform. Fixed costs, by their nature, are constant 
regardless of the number of performances. Orchestras may
expand the number of performances to lower their average
costs, or they may allow other activities to take place in 
the concert hall and receive rent income. The marginal cost 
of one more performance is comparatively low. Since fixed 
costs are a large fraction of total cost, it is logical to 
expand the number of performances to bring down the average
costs. If symphonies set the ticket price to match the low
marginal cost of an additional performance (or an additional 
attender if not sold out), they will fail to cover their
7Where average price includes all donations.
8Hansmann, "Nonprofit Enterprise in the Performing 
Arts," 341-361.
total costs. Hansmann concludes that if performing arts 
organizations practice price discrimination, they can 
capture enough consumer surplus to cover their total costs. 
Some price discrimination actually exists (eg., more is 
charged for the better seats), but is limited and 
insufficient to cover total costs. Hansmann and Baumol and 
Bowen contend that performing arts organizations hope that 
their patrons voluntarily pay an additional amount, in the 
form of donations, if the value they place on attendance 
exceeds the price charged for admission.
Most performing arts organizations find themselves in a 
predicament. With nonprofit firms, ticket price increases 
tend to decrease donations.9 As costs rise, nonprofit 
performing arts organizations will not try to immediately 
raise ticket prices, but rather attempt to increase the 
contributions they receive from patrons, or turn to the 
government for grants.
Both Baumol and Bowen and Hansmann agree that 
performing arts industries do not experience the same gains 
in productivity as other industries. Thus, the income gap 
exists and inevitably widens over time. Society must
9William Luksetich and Mark Lange. "Modelling and 
Estimating Nonprofit Behavior: Symphony Orchestras, 1991"
TMs [photocopy], 18-21, St. Cloud State University, Saint 
Cloud, Minnesota. Luksetich and Lange have found that price 
increases will significantly decrease attendance for all 
symphony orchestras. They have also found that gifts will 
significantly decrease for Major Orchestras. Price 
increases were found to significantly increase gifts in 
Small Budget Orchestras.
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contribute financial support to prevent the demise of the 
performing arts. This contribution can be made either 
through private donations, or through government subsidy.
If productivity growth was assumed constant across all 
industries, symphony orchestras will find it difficult to 
match the productivity increases through wage increases.
The rising costs which wage increases represent, would not 
pass to consumers through higher prices. These 
organizations will search out more donations and pursue 
grants, or idly watch their labor migrate toward higher wage 
industries.
If productivity growth was assumed to be higher in more 
capital intensive industries, (e.g., manufacturing) then 
symphony orchestras would be in even more of a dilemma.
There will be less gains from productivity to offset 
increasing costs (specifically the increasing wage bill).
The pressure on symphony orchestras will increase, forcing 
them to lessen their dependency on the labor market by 
changing output composition toward less labor intensive 
performances. In the extreme case, symphony orchestras will 
be forced to cut variable costs to zero and have no 
performances. This will occur, unless the income gap is met 
by society through donations and government grants.
The present study has as its focus the analysis of a 
data set on American symphony orchestras. The purpose of 
the analysis is to determine the credibility of the Baumol
8
assertions of (1) the existence of the income gap and (2) 
its inevitability.
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THE DATA
The data set employed in this study is one obtained 
from the American Symphony Orchestra League.10 The full 
data set is comprised of some 136 variables across the eight 
years from 1979 to 1986 for 53 orchestras.
The variables examined in this study are those given in 
Table 1. All orchestral variables (X, Y, and Z variables in 
Table 1) have the raw values provided in the data set or are 
generated therefrom. The demographic variables (I, M, N, 
and 0 variables in Table 1) were taken from Sales and 
Marketing Management.11 The variables expressed in money 
terms were converted from nominal to real values using the 
GNP Implicit Price Deflator and are thus expressed in 1982 
dollars.12 The means and standard deviations for the 
examined variables are then given in Table 2.13
10The American Symphony Orchestra League is an 
orchestra trade association headquartered in Washington DC.
11Sales and Marketing Management. 28 July 1978, cl-c228 
and subsequent eight July issues.
12Council of Economic Advisors, Economic Report of the 
President ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1990), 298.
13The output composition variables (X1 through X10 in 
Table 2) sum to more than one. This occurs because of 
double counting. For example, some regular subscription 
concerts are performed by a full orchestra.
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Table 1
Variables: Names and Definitions
Deficit (Yt) Earned income minus costs.
Lagged (Yt.,) 
Deficit
The deficit lagged by one period.
Average (Yt) 
Revenue
Earned income excluding private and public 
subsidies, divided by total concerts.
Average (Yt) 
Costs
Total costs of the orchestra divided by 
total concerts.
Regular (X,) 
Subscription
The number of regular subscriptions 
concerts divided by total concerts.
Nonsummer (X2) 
Subscription
The number of non summer subscription 
concerts divided by total concerts.
Other (X,) 
Home Concerts
The number of other home concerts divide' 
by total concerts.
C/Y/S (XJ 
Concerts
The number of child, youth, student 
concerts divided by total concerts.
Summer (X5) 
Subscription
The number of summer subscription concerts 
divided by total concerts.
Other (X6) 
Sum Concerts
The number of other summer concerts divided 
by total concerts.
Full (X7) 
Orchestra
The number of concerts performed with a 
full orchestra divided by total concerts.
Chamber (X8) 
Concerts
The number of chamber orchestra 
performances divided by total concerts.
Free (X,) 
Home Concerts
The number of free concerts in the home 
area divided by total concerts.
Special (X10) 
Constituents
The number of concerts for special 
constituents divided by total concerts.
Pop (N^ 
18 - 24
Percent of the home metropolitan area or 
county population between ages 18 and 24.
Pop (N2) 
25 - 34 Percent of the home metropolitan area or county population between ages 25 and 34.
Pop (N3) 
35 - 49 Percent of the home metropolitan area or county population between ages 3 5 and 49.
Pop (NJ 
50 + Percent of the home metropolitan area or county population 50 years old or older.
11
Inc > 25 (I) The percent of households with nominal 
income greater than twenty-five thousand 
dollars.
Median (M) 
HH Income
The median household income in the home 
metropolitan area or county.
Pop- (0) 
ulation
The population in the home metropolitan 
area or county.
No. of (Z,) 
players
The average number of players in the 
orchestra who are paid under a weekly 
contract.
Average (Z2) 
Salary
The average salary of a player per week.
a (alpha) The constant term.
e (epsilon) The error term.
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Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations () of Variables
Variables Premier Major Metropol Sml Budg
Deficit -4173000
(1154300)
-3022000
(1252400)
-881000
(483270)
-299110
(187970)
Average
Revenue
19200
(4448)
7003
(4868)
2958
(1889)
1795
(1207)
Average
Costs
26048
(5582)
13203
(6479)
5789
(3601)
3700
(2598)
Regular
Subscription
.4125 
(.1480) .
.2837 
(.1274)
.1790
(.1320)
.2780 
(.2700)
Nonsummer
Subscription
.0053 
(.0354)
.0700 
( .0521)
. 0610 
(.0680)
. 0220 
(.0557)
Other Home 
Concerts
. 0678 
(.0777)
.0980 
(.0825)
. 0870 
(.0780)
. 0460 
(.0471)
C/Y/S
Concerts
.0710 
(.0419)
.1130 
(.0864)
.1150 
(.1070)
.0670 
(.0636)
Summer
Subscription
.0690
(.0800)
.0320
(.0479)
. 0032 
( .0110)
. 0070 
(.0261)
Other Summer 
Concerts
.0780 
(.0758)
.0580
(.0690)
.0067 
( .0140)
. 0300 
(.0600)
Full
Orchestra
.8578
(.1640)
.7870
(.2170)
.5260 
(.2940)
.4987 
(.3520)
Chamber
Concerts
.0295 
(.0419)
. 1000 
(.1140)
.1332 
(.1630)
. 0810 
(. 1310)
Free Home 
Concerts
.0250 
(.0535)
.0720 
(.1160)
.1090
(.1900)
.1770 
(.2630)
Special
Constituents
.0010
(.0021)
.0120 
(.0290)
.0240 
(.0490)
.0200
(.0547)
Pop 18-24 12.23
(.93)
12.90
(1.43)
12.86
(1.07)
13.14
(2.50)
Pop 25-24 17.14
(.81)
18.43
(1.77)
17.94
(1.09)
17 .09 
(1.40)
Pop 35-49 18.16 
(1.08)
18.21
(1.50)
17.87
(1.16)
17.45
(1.40)
Pop 50 + 26.78
(2.26) 23.20(3.47)
24.40
(1.22)
25.66
(4.84)
13
Inc > 2 5 31.08 29.71 25.29 22.24
(12.81) (13.53) (11.59) (10.65)
Median HH 25739 25372 22989 21740
Income (1454) (2593) (2027) (2087)
Population 8254000 2171000 925380 534390
(5122100) (1241200) (343590) (288430)
No. of 104.90 85.35 41.00 7.70players (1.43) (18.69) (29.34) (17.00)
Average 615 503 292 82Salary (338) (207) (185) (210)
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To afford a measure of detail in the analysis, the data 
are arranged into four cross-section subset classifications 
by size of the budget from large to small. These four 
classifications are (1) Premier Orchestras, (2) Major 
Orchestras, (3) Metropolitan Orchestras, and (4) Small 
Budget Orchestras. The Premier Orchestra class is that 
suggested by Hale.14 The remaining three classes are those 
used for reporting purposes by the Statistical Abstract of 
the United States.15 This classification scheme results in 
6, 21, 11, and 15 orchestras in each of the above classes, 
respectively.16
The data set thus permits the examination of the 
orchestral deficits for four classes of orchestras over the 
period from 1979 to 1986. It is of interest to note that 
these years were potentially difficult years for symphony 
orchestras. The double digit inflation of the late 197 0s 
was followed by the recession of 1981-1982. The 1983-1986
^Rosemary Hale, "Economics and the Symphony 
Orchestra," TMs, photocopied. A paper presented at the 
1983 Midwest Economic Association Meeting. Six "Class A" 
orchestras are identified: the Boston Symphony, Chicago
Symphony, Cleveland Orchestra, Los Angeles Philharmonic, New 
York Philharmonic, the Philadelphia Orchestra.
15Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States. ([Washington, 
D.C.]: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1980).
16This classification scheme not only differentiates 
the orchestras by budget, but by performance activity. The 
mean number of annual performances for Premier Orchestras is 
231, for Major Orchestras it is 201, for Metropolitan 
Orchestras it is 163, and for Small Budget Orchestras it is 
136.
years were characterized by low inflation and economic 
expansion. However, this was also the time of the Reagan 
administration, which opposed federal support for the arts 
Thus, the time period examined was not one in which 
incentives were particularly favorable to the arts in 
general and symphonies in particular.
16
THE MODELS
The Baumol assertions are tested in the context of two 
models. The first, the growth model, is constructed to test 
the initial assertion of the existence of the income gap.
The second, the deficit model, is presented for the purpose 
of testing the assertion of the inevitability of the income 
gap.
The Growth Model.
The growth model is given in the following expression:
(1) Yc = P iV i ,  + ce,
where Yt is the current year deficit, is the deficit
lagged by one year, and et is the error term.
Equation 1 provides two pieces of information 
concerning the deficit. The first is whether the deficit 
persists from one period to the next period. This is 
determined by calculating a t-statistic to test if the 
coefficient on the lagged deficit is significantly different 
from zero. An insignificant coefficient is the basis for 
acceptance of the null hypothesis that the deficit is not 
exhibiting growth? conversely, a significant result will 
lead to an acceptance of the alternative hypothesis that the 
deficit is growing from one year to the next. The second
17
piece of information that Equation 1 presents is determined 
through a different t-test. If the coefficient on the 
lagged deficit is significantly greater than one, the 
average growth rate of the deficit from 1979 to 1986 is 
determined. By subtracting one from the coefficient, the 
average growth rate in the income gap over the 1979 to 1986 
period is calculated. This will lead us to accept the 
alternative hypothesis that the income gap exists and is 
growing.
Similar specifications are used to determine the growth 
in earned income and in costs. The same two t-tests are 
conducted to determine whether significant growth rates 
exist in income and costs. This will shed light on whether 
the deficit is a cost or a revenue side phenomenon.
The Deficit Model.
The deficit model is used to test the assertion of the 
inevitability of the income gap or deficit. The deficit is 
calculated by taking the earned income from performances and 
subtracting costs. Those variables which affect revenue and 
those which influence cost must both be included. Thus, to 
build a deficit model, revenue and cost specifications are 
preliminarily developed.
The revenue specification is built to test the effect 
of output composition on the revenues of symphonies, holding 
demographic characteristics constant. The model follows:
18
(2) y t = « + M i  + p2x, + P3Ar3 + p4*4 + p5x5 + p6x6 + p7x7 + p8x8 + p9̂  + p10x10
+ P u ^ l  + Pl2*2 + Pl3^3 + Pl4^4 + Pl5^ + Pl6^
+ Pl7^ + ®t'
where Yt is earned income per concert; X, through X10 are 
output composition variables defined in Table 1; N, through 
0 are demographic characteristics also defined in Table 1; 
and et is the error term.
Symphony orchestras perform different types of 
concerts. The output composition variables represent the 
different types of concerts as a proportion of total 
concerts. Significant coefficients on these variables 
suggest income sensitive types of output. In other words, 
orchestras can change their output composition in order to 
increase income. The N, M, I, and 0 variables represent 
demographic characteristics. These are held constant 
through each cross section, as we look at the impact of 
output composition on revenues.
The cost side specification relates orchestral costs to 
selected output and input variables. The cost model is as 
follows:
(3) Yt = a + + P2X8 + p3Z4 + P4Z2 + ec,
where Yt is the cost per concert; X7 and X8 are output
19
composition variables; Z, and Z2 are input variables; and et 
is the error term.
The output composition variables are included in the 
cost specification as they are expected to significantly 
influence costs. These are full orchestra concerts and
chamber concerts as a percentage of total concerts,
respectively. The cost of putting the full orchestra on the 
stage is larger than putting a chamber group on stage.17 
The Z variables represent the wages and the number of 
workers, respectively.
The deficit model then combines the revenue and cost 
specifications:
(4) Yt = a + + p2*i + p3*2 + p4X3+ P5*4 + p6X5 + p7*6 + p 8̂  + p9*8 + pi0*9
+ Pll*10 + Pl2^1 + Pl3^2 + Pl4^3 + Pl5^4
+ Pl6^ + Pl7 M  + Pl8^ + Pl9^1 + P20^2 + ®t'
where Yt is the current year deficit.
This model is not developed to empirically define the 
deficit. Rather, it is developed to test if the orchestras 
have some control over their deficits —  to test whether 
output composition decisions can be made to lower the 
deficit. It will suggest which variables are under the
17The percent of total concerts performed by ensembles are 
not included. Doing this would create a singular matrix.
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orchestra's control, thus demonstrating their ability to 
reduce and perhaps eliminate the income gap.
The coefficient on the lagged deficit (Yt-1) gives us 
direct information concerning the inevitability of the 
income gap. The t-statistic for this variable will show if 
the coefficient is significantly different from zero. A 
different t test is conducted to determine if the 
coefficient is significantly different from one. A computed 
t-statistic larger than the critical value of 1.96 will 
suggest a decreasing deficit over the period from 1979 to 
1986, other things equal. This result would cast some doubt 
on Baumol's assertion that the deficit is inevitable.
21
THE RESULTS
With the models constructed, we may now turn to examine 
the results obtained in this study.
The Growth Model Results.
The growth model results are given in Tables 3, 4, and
5. Provided here are the findings for the deficit, revenue
and cost growth models, respectively.
Table 3 shows the results of the deficit growth model. 
Two different t-statistics are given in the Table. The 
first demonstrates whether the coefficient on the lagged 
deficit is significantly different from zero. For all four 
cross sections this is the case. This suggests that a 
larger deficit in the current period leads to a larger 
deficit in the next period, from 1979 to 1986.
The second t-statistic is computed by subtracting one
from the coefficient on the lagged deficit and dividing by
the standard error. For each of the four classifications, 
the coefficients on the lagged deficit are significantly 
different from one. By subtracting one from the coefficient 
and multiplying by 100, the growth rate of the deficit is 
computed. The deficit of Premier Orchestras are observed to 
be growing by 5.33 percent over the 1979 to 1986 period.
The growth in the deficit of Major Orchestras is 3.69
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percent. For Metropolitan Orchestras the deficit is 
growing at a 9.69 percent rate over the period, while the 
Small Budget Orchestra deficit is growing at a 9.42 percent 
rate.
Table 3 
Deficit Growth Model
Orchestra Coefficient on 
Lagged Deficit
t-statistic 
from zero
t-statistic 
from one
Premier 1.0533 100.900 3.500
Major 1.0369 135.640 4.830
Metropol. 1.0969 63.194 5.580
Small
Budget
1.0942 80.408 6.920
Table 4 
Revenue Growth Model
Orchestra Coefficient on 
Lagged Revenue
t-statistic 
from zero
t-statistic 
from one
Premier 1.065 127.320 7.790
Major 1.068 130.760 8.330
Metropol. 1.034 95.015 3 .160
Small
Budget
1.061 81.488 4.660
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Table 5 
Cost Growth Model
Orchestras Coefficients on 
Lagged Cost
t-statistic 
from zero
t-statistic 
from one
Premier 1.066 127.320 7.790
Major 1.062 176.510 10.060
Metropol. 1.045 87.728 3.810
Small
Budget
1.072 88.630 5.980
This leads us to accept the alternative hypothesis that 
the income gap exists. It can be said with 95 percent 
confidence that the Baumol assertion that the income gap 
exists and is growing is correct.
The results in Table 4 and 5 use a specification 
similar to that in equation 1. The difference is that Y is 
earned income and costs respectively. The same two t-tests 
are conducted. This suggests that revenues and costs have 
significant growth rates over the 1979 to 1986 period.
This is of interest as it shows both costs and 
revenues, in real dollars, growing from 1979 to 198 6. From 
these observed results it is not possible to conclude that 
the income gap is either a cost or a revenue side 
phenomenon.
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The Deficit Model Results.
The deficit model was constructed from separate revenue 
and cost models. The results for the revenue, or earned 
income, specification appear in Table 6 while those for the 
cost specification are given in Table 7.
The revenue specification shows that output composition 
has a significant effect on the earned income for each 
classification. For example, revenue per concert 
significantly increases as the percent of regular 
subscription concerts increases for all but Premier 
Orchestras. This model also shows the effects of exogenous, 
demographic variables on earned income per concert. The 
population variable has a significant positive influence on 
Metropolitan and Major Orchestras, a significant negative 
effect on Premier Orchestras, and no significant 
relationship with Small Budget Orchestras.18
The results for the cost specification suggest that 
output composition has a significant impact on costs for all 
but Premier Orchestras. The number of players under weekly 
contract and the average salary per week variables are 
included because of an a priori belief that they have a 
positive impact on cost per concert. For Premier 
Orchestras, the number of players variable has a significant
18A. Buse, "Goodness-of-Fit in the Generalized Least 
Squares Estimation," The American Statistician 27 (1979): 
106-108. This R-square is corrected for pooled, cross section 
data.
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negative impact on costs per concert.19
The results for the deficit model, which combines the
foregoing revenue and cost specifications, are given in 
Table 8.
It is apparent from these results that certain of the 
output composition variables are significantly related to 
the deficits for each of the orchestral cross sections with
the exception of Small Budget Orchestras. In the case of
Premier Orchestras, other summer concerts increase the 
deficit; here a one percent increase in other summer 
concerts, other things equal, increases the deficit by about 
$52,000.20 In the case of Major Orchestras, increases in 
summer subscriptions and other summer concerts significantly 
increase the deficit. The deficit among Metropolitan 
Orchestras is increased by greater numbers of regular 
subscription, non-summer subscription, and other home 
concerts. On the whole, these results suggest that the 
larger orchestras can influence to some degree their 
deficits by altering their output mix of concerts.
19The marginal cost of hiring an additional worker is 
apparently less than the resulting increase in the average 
costs for these orchestras.
20The dependent variable, earned income deficit, has a 
negative sign in all of its observation values. Negative 
signs on the coefficients of the independent variables 
signals a direct relationship between the independent 
variable and the deficit since the deficit is a negative 
number in the data set.
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Table 6
Revenue Model —  All Orchestras
Independent
Variables
Premier
Orchestra
Major
Orchestra
Metropol
Orchestra
Small
Budget
Regular
Subscriptions
80.11
(1.2)
107.42 * 
(7.1)
77.95 * 
(8.13)
19.18 * 
(2.85)
Non Summer 
Subscriptions
172.87 * 
(3.03)
90.44 * 
(4.02)
19.788
(1.6)
16.8
(1.82)
Other Home 
Concerts
63.451
(1.39)
39.61 * 
(2.25)
-16.63
(-1.44)
-6.96
(-.73)
C/Y/S
Concerts
-13.56
(-.097)
-22.1
(-1.42)
-21.32 * 
(-2.79)
-16.30
(-1.4)
Summer
Subscriptions
85.91
(1.07)
78.38 * 
(2.76)
105.23 * 
(2.49)
-33.95 * 
(-2.45)
Other Summer 
Concerts
-66.68
(-1.24)
15.22
(.752)
12.58
(.396)
-21.73 * 
(-2.51)
Full
Orchestra
70.88
(1.27)
6.94
(.596)
18.48 * 
(2.67)
21.70 * 
(4.04)
Chamber
Concerts
-233.92 * 
(-3.85)
22.328
(1.84)
3.4
(.83)
12.69 * 
(3.27)
Free Home 
Concerts
17.07
(.312)
7.64
(-1.22)
-5.36 * 
(-2.09)
-2.93 * 
(-2.39)
Special
Constituents
558.72
(.764)
-21.13
(-.84)
6.92
(.601)
1. 08 
(.293)
Pop 18-24 -.0311
(-.0034)
.148
(.119)
-2.34 * 
(-1.96)
1.31 * 
(3.42)
Pop 25-34 32.35 * 
(5.7) -.733(-.469)
2.76 * 
(3.35)
1.12 * 
(2.4)
Pop 35-49 17.9 * 
(2.84)
5.7 * 
(4.26)
.979
(1.07)
1.98 * 
(3.85)
Pop 50+ .822
(.815)
2.59 * 
(2.5)
1.2
(1.92)
.195
(1.4)
Income > 25 -.143
(-1.31)
.0798
(1.38)
.0513
(1.19)
.0186
(.877)
Median HH 
Income
-.768 * 
(-6.09)
-.0656
(-1.33)
-.0701
(-1.87)
. 0178 
(.922)
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Population -.0031 ♦ 
(-2.6)
.0076 * 
(3.7)
.0039 * 
(2.19)
.0037
(1.4)
Constant -572.68 * 
(-2.78)
-138.3 * 
(-2.45)
-47.00 
(-1.01)
-78.93 * 
(-4.83)
Buse R-square .9589 . 9075 .9604 .8459
F Statistic 41.206 86.535 99.879 32.93
t-statistics are in parentheses ().
♦Coefficient significantly different from zero.
Table 7
Cost Model —  All Orchestras
Independent
Variables
Premier
Orchestra
Major
Orchestra
Metropol
Orchestra
Small
Budget
Full
Orchestra
69.1
(1.01)
142.49 ♦ 
(9.41)
84.66 ♦ 
(11.4)
60.43 ♦ 
(17.1)
Chamber
Concerts
-169.92
(-1.06)
101.48 ♦ 
(4.61)
19.31
(1.64)
38.95 ♦ 
(5.1)
No. of players 
week contract
-7.88 ♦ 
(-2.21)
.404 ♦ 
(2.13)
.0564
(.899)
.0275
(.782)
Avg. Salary 
per week
.00303
(.193)
.0118
(1.33)
.0429 ♦ 
(4.09)
.0012
(.656)
Constant 1027.6 ♦ 
(2.7)
-30.1
(-1.8)
-4.058
(-.86)
5.74 * 
(3.85)
Buse R-square .1670 .4217 .9641 .7655
F Statistic 2.156 29.717 47.1 93.856
t-statistics are in parentheses ().
♦Coefficient is significantly different from zero.
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Table 8
Deficit Model - All Orchestras
Independent
Variables
Premier
Orchestra
Major
Orchestra
Metropol. 
Orchestra
Small
Budget
Lagged
Deficit
.701 * 
(3.64)
.6996 * 
(14.46)
.8015 * 
(9.36)
.89 * 
(15.9)
Regular
Subscriptions
7770
(.25)
7420.2
(1.42)
-6667.2 * 
(-2.2)
330.3
(-7)
Non Summer 
Subscriptions
-28037
(-.7)
8177.6 
( 1.31)
-8892.6 * 
(-2.2)
928.2
(.8)
Other Home 
Concerts
-30541
(-1.2)
3282.1
(.61)
-12297 * 
(-2.8)
1261
(1.4)
C/Y/S
Concerts
-45898
(-.9)
4934
(1.14)
-573.8 
(-.23)
357.1 
(.37)
Summer
Subscriptions
-42010
(-1.1)
-18062 * 
(-2.8)
2570.5
(.18)
13.1 
(.01)
Other Summer 
Concerts
-52001 * 
(-1.98)
-15384 * 
(-2.8)
-17281
(-1.7)
147.8
(.23)
Full
Orchestra
15306
(.65)
-6365.7
(-1.8)
4064.4
(1.75)
-367
(-.8)
Chamber
Concerts
-6275.9
(-.23)
3289.8
(1.13)
1669.7
(1.3)
448.2
(1.3)
Free Home 
Concerts
-6297.4
(-.45)
1681.3
(.68)
1360.3
(1.51)
-311
(-1.5)
Special
Constituents
318130
(1.1)
2124.9
(.22)
-1657
(-.5)
-409
(-.5)
Pop 18-24 122.49
(.04)
-678.67 
(-1.80)
-89.61
(-.26)
60.1 
(1.21)
Pop 25-34 932.45
(.426)
303.92
(.69)
-247.08
(-1.09)
-217 * 
(-3.7)
Pop 35-49 -3433.6
(-1.65)
-745.27
(-1.87)
-104.96 
(-.3)
55.48
(.85)
Pop 50 + 270.78
(.58)
-24.96
(-.14)
67.333
(.338)
4.88
(.19)
Income > 25 147.16 * 
(2.68)
-56.17 * 
(-2.78)
-10.82
(-.79)
-7.87 * 
(-2.1)
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Median HH 
Income
-129.8 * 
(-2.04)
-.1005
(-.007)
11.29
(1.07)
1. 71 
(.886)
Population -.388
(-.802)
-2.74 * 
(-5.64)
-.356
(-.414)
-.726 * 
(-2.8)
# of players 
week contract
-101.97
(-.18)
-12.4
(-.55)
-13.39 * 
(-2.1)
-1.36
(-.42)
Avg. Salary 
per week
4.51
(1.88)
-.24
(-.16)
-1.118
(-.797)
-.063
(-.3)
Constant 59627
(.55)
18964
(1.5)
2734.7
(.2)
1486
(.72)
Buse R-square .9644 .9094 .9527 .9637
F Statistic 36.612 73.734 67.45 131.55
t-statistics are in parentheses.
♦Coefficient significantly different from zero.
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It was noted among these results that in the case of 
Metropolitan Orchestras, increased regular subscription 
concerts add to the deficit of such orchestras. This result 
suggests the possibility that Metropolitan Orchestras are 
not maximizing just earned income, but rather both earned 
income and contributions. In other words, perhaps these 
orchestras are practicing Hansmann's voluntary price 
discrimination.
Important, as well, for our purpose, are the 
coefficients on the lagged deficit. In each case, this 
coefficient is significantly greater than zero. In the 
cases of the Major, Metropolitan and Small Budget Orchestras 
each coefficient was also found to be significantly less 
than one.21 Apparently the income gap for these three 
types of orchestras declined significantly over the examined 
period. Since the coefficient for Premier Orchestras was 
not found to be significantly less than one, it appears that 
the income gap among these orchestras did not decline 
significantly over the examined period.
In sum, the results for the deficit model contain mixed 
findings. On the one hand, in the cases of Major and 
Metropolitan Orchestras, the deficit was found to be 
sensitive to the orchestras' output composition. Moreover, 
these deficits were found to have declined over the period
21The t-statistic for Major, Premier, Metropolitan and 
Small Budget orchestras are -6.21, -1.55, -2.32, and -2.02, 
respectively.
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analyzed. On the other hand, Premier and Small Budget 
Orchestras each had a unique situation. For Premier 
Orchestras the deficit was found to be sensitive to output 
composition, yet it was found not to be significantly 
declining. For Small Budget Orchestras, the deficit 
significantly declined over the period, yet none of the 
output composition variables was significant. The weight of 
the evidence with respect to Major and Metropolitan 
Orchestras is that the income gap is not inevitable while 
the evidence with respect to Premier and Small Budget 
Orchestras is mixed.
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THE CONCLUSIONS
This paper empirically tests Baumol's diagnosis of the 
income gap for symphony orchestras. The research problem 
centered on an examination of two testable assertions. The 
first was that the income gap exists, and the second was 
that it is inevitable.
These assertions were tested using a data set for 53 
orchestras covering the period from 1979 to 1986. The 
orchestras were examined in the following four classes 
determined by the size of budget: Premier Orchestras, Major
Orchestras, Metropolitan Orchestras, and Small Budget 
Orchestras.
A growth model was constructed to test the first 
assertion. It was found here that there was a significant 
growth in the deficit for all orchestras over the period. 
Thus, the deficit was found to be present and growing.
A deficit model containing output composition and 
demographic control variables was constructed to test the 
second assertion. Here we found the income gap to be 
decreasing, other things equal, in the Major, Metropolitan, 
and Small Budget Orchestras. This casts some doubt on the 
inevitability of the income gap. Furthermore, it was found 
that the deficits in the Premier, Major, and Metropolitan 
Orchestras were sensitive to the mix of concerts offered by
the orchestras. The weight of this evidence suggests that 
orchestras are to some extent able to exert control over 
their deficits.
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